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Abstract
This article considers the risk of disclosure in linked databases
when statistical analysis of micro-data is permitted. The risk of dis-
closure needs to be balanced against the utility of the linked data.
The current work specifically considers the disclosure risks in permit-
ting regression analysis to be performed on linked data. A new attack
based on partitioning of the database is presented.
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1 Introduction
Large amounts of micro-data are collected by government agencies through
surveys, censuses and administrative sources. On the one hand, the custodi-
ans of these data are legally responsible for minimizing the risk of disclosure
of sensitive information contained in these data; on the other, these data
may contain vital information that may be used to inform public policy or
be of other benefit to society. Useful information can be obtained by linking
the micro-data collected by different data custodians. In Australia, the Aus-
tralian Bureau of Statistics (abs) is charged with the task of linking data
from different custodians (e.g., government departments). In other words,
the abs serves as an integrating authority. As an integrating authority, the
abs needs to maximize the inherent value of the linked data, while protect-
ing the legislative requirements of all data custodians. Balancing utility and
disclosure risk is thus a serious issue for the abs. Formally, disclosure is
said to occur if data can be attributed to a specific entity (person or or-
ganization) from whom it was collected. On a naive level, it may appear
that it would be sufficient for the abs to adopt the same safeguards against
disclosure as the submitting data custodian. However, the risk of disclo-
sure of data from linked databases is far greater than the risk of disclosure
from a single database. These risks have been studied by a number of au-
thors including Gomatam et al [6], O’Keefe and Good [9], Reiter [10], Reiter
and Kohnen [11], Reznek [12], Sparks et al (2005) [14] and Sparks et al
(2008) [15]. In addition, Duncan et al [5] and Hundepool et al [7] are good
general references on statistical disclosure control.
The abs makes linked data available to legitimate users such as gov-
ernment departments and university researchers. To minimize the risk of
disclosure, these users are not allowed direct access to the data. Instead,
the users are required to log in to a secure remote server, on which they
are permitted to perform specific analyses. Only the results of the analyses
are made available to the user. Traditionally, the permitted analyses have
been limited to the generation of descriptive statistics, graphs, and simple
hypothesis tests. However due to growing demand from researchers, the abs
is working on a system that permits the development of a limited number of
statistical models, such as regression analysis. Previous research on manag-
ing the disclosure risk presented by statistical modelling focused primarily
on legitimate users who are not also data custodians (for example, see Sparks
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(2008) et al [15] or O’Keefe and Chipperfield [8]). However, the possibility
that a malicious individual working for one of the data custodians may try
to obtain data to which it is not entitled adds another dimension to man-
agement of the disclosure risk. For example, one data custodian (dc-a) may
develop statistical models which combine data that it contributed with data
from another data custodian (dc-b). Although dc-a has complete informa-
tion on the data it submitted, dc-a is not legally allowed to have access to
raw data submitted by dc-b. In view of this, the abs needs to minimize the
risk that dc-a may exploit knowledge of its own data, to develop a statistical
model that results in disclosure of data submitted by dc-b.
More formally, the question considered is stated as follows. Is it possible
for a malicious entity to exploit statistical models to by-pass the system of
safeguards that are currently in place? The specific situation considered in
this work is limited to one where the malicious entity is also a data custodian.
Furthermore, the statistical models considered are limited to linear regres-
sion models whose coefficients are estimated by the least squares method.
Section 2 describes some of the known attacks on the system and some of
the safeguards that abs currently has in place to defend against these at-
tacks. Section 3 presents a new attack based on partitioning the data set.
Section 4 discusses some of the consequences of the new attack, and whether
existing safeguards may be sufficient to protect against this attack. Section 5
provides conclusions and directions for future work.
2 Known attacks and existing defences
As a first line of defence, the abs has established a protocol that requires
users to log in to a remote server and perform statistical analysis on the
server. Rather than have access to the raw data, the user is only permitted
to view the results of the analysis that he or she requests. This includes de-
scriptive statistics such as means, medians and standard deviations, graphs,
results of hypothesis tests including p-values and confidence intervals, cor-
relation and regression coefficients, their standard errors and related confi-
dence intervals or p-values. However, even with these protections in place,
the system contains vulnerabilities that can result in disclosure. Over the
past decade or so, a number of researchers have studied vulnerabilities in
linked statistical databases and proposed defences against them. O’Keefe
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and Chipperfield [8] provides a good summary of the current state of re-
search on reducing the risk of disclosure.
We consider a specific scenario which was presented by the abs for con-
sideration at MISG 2013. In this scenario the entity trying to exploit these
vulnerabilities is also a data custodian who has submitted some data to the
linked database. This may not be a likely scenario. However, the onus of
protecting against such attacks by rogue entities or rogue employees of a gen-
uine data custodian, falls on the abs, in its role as an integrating authority.
The scenario may be described more formally as follows.
Suppose that two data custodians, dc-a and dc-b are custodians of
different sets of data for the same sample of a population. For simplicity,
suppose dc-a has contributed variables x1,x2, . . . ,xp to the linked database,
and dc-b has submitted variable y to the same linked database. Since dc-a
is a custodian of the variables x1,x2, . . . ,xp, it has complete information
on these variables for each entity in the population. In addition, dc-a may
have access to the identity of each entity in the population. However, dc-a
is not legally entitled to the value of y for specific entities. Suppose also,
that dc-a is entitled to perform regression analysis (via a remote server) on
the linked database that includes the variables x1,x2, . . . ,xp and y. Finally,
suppose that dc-a is interested in attacking the database to try and deter-
mine the value of y for a specific entity. If y is a continuous variable, some
of the known vulnerabilities that dc-a could exploit are described below.
We note that these vulnerabilities can be exploited by anyone with access
to the remote analysis server, even if they are not data custodians. These
attacks are discussed extensively in the literature (for example, see O’Keefe
and Chipperfield [8]). However, the additional information available to a
data custodian (dc-a) makes the system more vulnerable to these attacks.
Therefore these attacks are presented below, only in the context of the at-
tacker being the data custodian, dc-a, who has partial knowledge of the
data set, as described above.
Perfect models or models with very high correlation A perfect
model is one which perfectly fits the data. If dc-a is able to identify a
perfect model with one or more of x1,x2, . . . ,xp as the independent vari-
able(s), and y as the dependent variable, it would be able to use knowledge
of the variables x1,x2, . . . ,xp, to find the exact value of y for all entities in
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the database. Furthermore, even if the model is not perfect, a model with
very high correlation may enable dc-a to determine the value of y to a very
high degree of accuracy. This would present an unacceptable level of dis-
closure risk. O’Keefe and Chipperfield [8] present additional details in the
more general case where the attacker is not necessarily a data custodian.
Saturated Models A saturated model is one which has a very large num-
ber of independent variables. From a statistical perspective, saturated mod-
els are not considered to be good models, since they tend to underestimate
the regression coefficients of individual independent variables. However, sat-
urated models often have very high predictive ability, and can generally be
used to predict the value of the dependent variable with a high degree of
accuracy. Once again, if dc-a is able to exploit this property of saturated
models, then it would present an unacceptable disclosure risk. O’Keefe and
Chipperfield [8] and Ritchie [13] present additional details in the general case
where the attacker is not necessarily a data custodian.
Sparse Models In this context, a sparse model is one which has very few
unique data points. For example a sparse model may consist of just one
data point, in which case, it presents the exact value for a specific entity.
Alternatively, if the number of data points equals the number of independent
variables, the model equation could exactly (or with a very high degree
of accuracy) determine the hyperplane through the points that were used
to develop the model. From a statistical perspective, sparse models are
not considered good models, because they rarely (if ever) have statistically
significant coefficients. However, if dc-a is able to fit a sparse model, it
would be able to accurately identify the value of y for each entity, whose
data was used to develop the regression model. O’Keefe and Chipperfield [8]
and Sparks et al (2008) [15] present details of the issues related sparse models
in a more general context.
There are some obvious defences against the simple vulnerabilities de-
scribed above. These have been studied extensively, and have been imple-
mented in the abs remote server systems. Chipperfield et al [2]present these
and other simple defences. Some of these defences include the following.
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Models with very high correlation are not permitted The abs sys-
tem is designed to disallow regression models with R2 > 0.95 (R > 0.975).
This provides a defence against the vulnerability presented by perfect models
or models with very high correlation.
Defence against saturated models The number of independent vari-
ables is restricted to 30. This reduces the likelihood that any user is able to
develop a saturated model.
Defence against Sparse models The minimum number of points that
can be selected for modeling is set at 50. Together with the restriction on
the number of independent variables, this prevents a user from developing a
sparse model.
Several other simple attacks have been considered and defences against
these attacks have already been implemented in the abs system. These
attacks and defences are not considered here. Instead, the rest of this section
focuses on some of the more sophisticated known attacks, which involve
comparing or aggregating the results of several regression models obtained
from the remote server.
Differencing Attack Suppose dc-a wants to target the y-value, yE, as-
sociated with a specific entity, E. dc-a may try to achieve this as follows:
First, dc-a uses the remote server to develop a regression model on the en-
tire data set with x1,x2, . . . ,xp as the independent variables and y as the
dependent variable. Suppose this regression yields β0, β1, β2, . . . , βp as the
estimates of the regression coefficients. Next, dc-a drops the data point
(x1E, x2E, . . . , xpE, yE) related to E, and performs the same regression on
the reduced data set. Suppose the corresponding estimates of the regression
coefficients are β0E′ , β1E′ , . . . , βpE′ . dc-a can then exploit its knowledge of
x1,x2, . . . ,xp, to calculate yE. Cox [3] and in O’Keefe and Chipperfield [8]
present the differencing attack in a more general context.
Leverage Attack: The leverage h of a data point (x1, x2, . . . , xp) is a mea-
sure of its distance from (x¯1, x¯2, . . . , x¯p) where x¯i is the arithmetic mean of
the variable xi [16]. If a data point has a high leverage value, a regres-
sion model may predict its y-value very accurately. The leverage of a point
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depends only on its values on the independent variables and not on the de-
pendent variable. Therefore, dc-a can use its knowledge of x1,x2, . . . ,xp to
identify leverage points and exploit this information to determine the y-value
for any entity that has a high leverage value. On a more sophisticated level,
dc-a could use an appropriate transformation on x1,x2, . . . ,xp to force a
specific entity to have a high leverage value. It could then use the remote
server to develop a regression model with the transformed x-variables as the
independent variables and y as the dependent variable. The resulting regres-
sion equation can be expected to accurately determine the y-value for the
entity with high leverage value. Details of the leverage attack are presented
in a more general context by O’Keele and Chipperfield [8] and Gomatam et
al [6].
The abs has implemented a number of defences against these and other
potentially sophisticated attacks on the system. The simpler defences in-
volve dropping points from the data set and restricting transformations.
For example, points with a high leverage value are dropped from the re-
quested analysis, if they are detected. In addition, a few points are randomly
dropped from the data set to minimize the risk of a successful attack against
a specific entity. Furthermore there are restrictions on the types of trans-
formations that are permitted. Specifically, transformations that combine
variables that are contributed by different data custodians are disallowed.
All these defences are designed to prevent leverage and differencing attacks,
and to minimize the likelihood of success of other attacks that may not yet
be known. Chipperfield et al [2] present details of these defences.
A more sophisticated defence involves perturbation of the regression out-
put. This defence mechanism works by adding a small amount of noise to the
estimating equations. The amount of noise needs to be carefully determined
since large changes in the size of the regression coefficients or related p-values
would compromise the utility of the output. In addition, the perturbation
cannot significantly alter the error distribution, since it could compromise
confidence in the model fit. A detailed anslysis of these issues is presented by
Dwork et al [4]. The perturbation algorithm used by the abs is confidential
and is not presented here. Some of the details and associated challenges are
presented by Chipperfield at al [2].
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3 The split leverage attack
This section presents a new attack called the split leverage attack, which was
developed during the misg. The attack is designed to exploit the vulner-
ability presented by the existence of a high leverage point in the dataset.
It involves partitioning the data into disjoint subsets to prevent the system
from detecting the leverage point; hence the name, split leverage attack. In
general, finding an appropriate partition may be a difficult task, especially if
the attacker does not have access to the raw data. However, if the attacker
is also the data custodian who submitted the raw data on the independent
variables, then finding an appropriate partition would certainly be feasible.
This is a key assumption of the attack.
As in the previous section, suppose that two data custodians, dc-a and
dc-b are custodians of different sets of data for the same sample of a pop-
ulation. For simplicity, suppose dc-a has contributed data on variables
x1,x2, . . . ,xp to the linked database, and dc-b has submitted data on a
continuous variable y to the same linked database. Since dc-a is a cus-
todian of the variables x1,x2, . . . ,xp, it has complete information on these
variables for each entity in the population. However, dc-a is not legally
entitled to the value of y for specific entities. Suppose also, that the data
set contains a high leverage point, l and that dc-a is interested in exploiting
knowledge of this high leverage point to gain information about the y-value
of the entity associated with l. As before, assume that dc-a is permitted to
perform regression analysis (via a remote server) on the linked database that
includes the variables x1,x2, . . . ,xp and y. dc-a cannot directly use the re-
mote server to gain information of the y-value associated with l, since the
server would detect l as a high leverage point and exclude it from the anal-
ysis. The split leverage attack, which is designed to bypass this protection,
is described below.
Proposition 1 (Split leverage attack) 1. Assume that dc-a has com-
plete information on the data matrix,
X =

x11 x12 · · · x1p
x21 x22 · · · x2p
...
...
. . .
...
xn1 xn2 · · · xnp
 ,
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associated with the independent variables, x1,x2, . . . ,xp.
2. Assume that X contains a high leverage point l, and that dc-a uses
its knowledge of complete information on X to find l.
3. Next, suppose dc-a partitions the data matrix, X, into two disjoint
subsets X1 consisting of m rows of X and X2, consisting of the re-
maining (n−m) rows of X. Both X1 and X2 contain data on all
p independent variables; however, X1 and X2 contain different data
points.
4. Suppose also, that dc-a is able exploit complete information on X to
find X1, X2 such that X = X1 ∪ X2, X1 ∩ X2 = ∅, and neither X1
nor X2 contains a high leverage point. dc-a can also ensure that each
of these subsets contains the minimum number of points required to
circumvent other protections.
5. dc-a can then use the remote server to separately regress y on X1 and
y on X2.
6. Let β01, β11, β21, . . . , βp1 be the estimates of the regression coefficients
obtained by regressing y on X1 and β02, β12, β22, . . . , βp2 be the estimates
of the regression coefficients obtained by regressing y on X2.
7. Next, suppose dc-a uses its own computer to calculate yˆi1 = β01 +
β11xi1 + β21xi2 + · · ·+ βp1xip for each (xi1, xi2, . . . , xip) ∈ X1 and yˆj2 =
β02 + β12xj1 + β22xj2 + · · ·+ βp2xjp for each (xj1, xj2, . . . , xjp) ∈ X2.
8. Let yˆ1 = {yˆi1 : xi ∈ X1}, yˆ2 = {yˆj2 : xj ∈ X2} and yˆ = yˆ1 ∪ yˆ2 .
9. dc-a can then use complete information on X, and its own computer
to regress the yˆ values on the entire set X.
10. Then, the values of the regression coefficients of this final regression
model of yˆ on X are identical to those obtained by regressing y on X.
11. dc-a can thus overcome the protection against high leverage points and
obtain a regression model with a high leverage point l.
12. Since l is a high leverage point, the model accurately estimates the value
of y associated with l, resulting in unacceptable disclosure.
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The proposition (specifically point 10) follows from a more general result
(Theorem 2), which is proved in Section 4. The viability and consequences
of this attack are also discussed in the next section.
4 Extensions and Consequences of the Split
Leverage Attack
The abs system has a number of protections in place to minimize the risk
of disclosure in various situations. The obvious question, then, is whether
any of the existing protections might be sufficient to protect against the
split leverage attack presented in the previous section. The most interesting
question in this regard is whether perturbation of the regression coefficients
might have a protective effect against the split leverage attack. This question
arose at misg, but is yet to be considered. Another interesting question is
whether the measure of disallowing models with high correlation coefficient
(R2 > 0.95) might be sufficient to protect against the split leverage attack.
This question was also not considered at the misg. However, subsequent sim-
ulations were performed using randomly generated datasets. The regression
coefficients for the randomly generated data and the split leverage attack
were estimated using Mathematica 8 [17]. An examination of the results of
these simulations suggested the following.
1. The regression on the original data set X, can be re-created (to a very
high degree of precision) by the split leverage attack provided that the
subsets X1 and X2, into which X is partitioned, are disjoint.
2. If X contains a high leverage point, then it is possible to partition
the original data set into disjoint subsets X1 and X2, neither of which
contains a high leverage point, provided |X| ≥ 6.
3. The split leverage attack appears to work even for data where the
correlation coefficient (on the full data set) is below 0.8.
4. The attack also appears to work when the correlation coefficient on
each of the subsets X1 and X2 is low (of the order of 0.3 or below).
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5. Some simulations showed that the correlation coefficients of the regres-
sion models on the disjoint subsets X1 and X2 can be much lower than
on the original regression model on X.
6. The re-creation of the regression on the full data set appears to work
whether the full data set has a leverage point or not.
Point 3, above, suggests that the protection against models with high
correlation is not sufficient to protect against the split leverage attack. In
addition, points 3, 4, 5 and 6 suggest that it might be possible to overcome
the protection against models with high correlation coefficient, by parti-
tioning the data into disjoint subsets. However, partitioning the data into
subsets that lowers the correlation coefficient for models on both subsets X1
and X2 may be hard to achieve since it may require some information about
the y-values. Of course, the attacker may try to use brute force to find an
appropriate partition. It is unlikely that a brute force attack of this nature
would be computationally feasible. On the other hand, the attacker may
be able to gain partial information about the y-values through some kind of
intelligent sequential partitioning of the dataset. Such an attack has not yet
been explored. Point 6 is formally proved in the following theorem. Point 1
(the split leverage attack) follows as a special case, in which the data set
contains a leverage point. Although points 3, 4 and 5 are not explicitly
proved, the follow implicitly from the theorem. The formal exploration of
point 2 remains an open conjecture.
Theorem 2 Let X, Y be continuous random variables. The linear regres-
sion of Y on X can be re-created as follows:
1. Partition X into two disjoint sets X1 and X2. Let Y1 be the y-values
associated with the x-values in X1 and Y2 be the y-values associated
with x-values in X2.
2. Perform regression on (X1, Y1); let Yˆ1 be the y-values predicted by this
regression.
3. Perform regression on (X2, Y2); let Yˆ2 be the y-values predicted by this
regression.
4. Let (X, Yˆ ) = (X1, Yˆ1) ∪ (X2, Yˆ2).
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5. Perform a linear regression on (X, Yˆ ).
Then, regressing Yˆ on X yields the same equation as regressing Y on X.
This result is a little more general than the split leverage attack, since
it does not require the presence of a high leverage point. This could be an
important result in information security, since it shows how to reconstruct
a regression model on a data set, by developing models on subsets of the
data. However, it may not be of much interest to statisticians since it does
not appear to have any direct application to statistics. In spite of this,
Wetherill [16] presents a number of results similar to this one, in a section
on sub-model analysis. If these results on sub-model analysis could be re-
interpreted in the context of information security, then they could potentially
be used to refine and improve the split leverage attack, or to develop new
attacks on linked databases.
We present the proof of Theorem 2 below, and refer the reader to Anton
and Rorres [1] or any other standard book for the details of the linear algebra.
Proof: Let X = {xT1 ,xT2 , . . . ,xTn} be a set of row vectors of length m, and
let Y be represented by y, a vector of length n. Let M be the matrix
M =

1 xT1
1 xT2
...
...
1 xTn
 .
Then the coefficients of the least squares regression of Y on X are
v = (MTM)−1MTy. (1)
Suppose that the set N = {1, 2, . . . , n} is partitioned such that A ∪B =
N , A ∩B = ∅ where X1 = {xi | i ∈ A} and X2 = {xi | I ∈ B}. Let
P =

1 xTi
1 xTj
...
...
1 xTk
 such that i < j < k ∈ A,
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Q =

1 xTi
1 xTj
...
...
1 xTk
 such that i < j < k ∈ B.
Let Y1 be represented by the vector
φ =

yi
yj
...
yk
 such that i < j < k ∈ A,
and Y2 be represented by the vector
ψ =

yi
yj
...
yk
 such that i < j < k ∈ B.
Then the coefficients of the least squares regression of Y1 on X1 are
vA =(P
TP )−1P Tφ,
and the coefficients of the least squares regression of Y2 on X2 are
vB =(Q
TQ)−1QTψ. (2)
Let Yˆ be represented by the vector ζ such that
ζi =
{
Mi · vA if i ∈ A ,
Mi · vB if i ∈ B ,
where Mi is the ith row of M .
Without loss of generality assume that the rows of M and corresponding
entries of y have been arranged such that
M =
[
P
Q
]
and y =
[
φ
ψ
]
.
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Consequently
ζ =
[
PvA
QvB
]
Note that
MTζ =
[
P TQT
] [PvA
QvB
]
=
[
P TPva +Q
TQvB
]
(3)
and
MTy =
[
P TQT
] [ψ
φ
]
=
[
P Tφ+QTψ
]
. (4)
Consider φ, then
vA =(P
TP )−1P Tφ, (5)
(P TP )−1P TPvA =(P TP )−1P Tφ, (6)
P TPvA =P
Tφ. (7)
A similar argument shows that
QTQvB = Q
Tψ. (8)
From equations (3), (7) and (8)
MTζ =
[
P Tφ+QTψ
]
= MTy. (9)
Hence
(MTM)−1MTζ = (MTM)−1MTy = v. (10)
Hence the least squares regression equation of Yˆ on X is identical to the
least squares regression equation of Y on X. ♠
We conclude this section with a discussion of possible defences against the
split leverage attack. The split leverage attack will only re-create regression
equations—not the original data. So if the regression output from the server
is perturbed, then it would only re-create the perturbed y-values. In theory,
this suggests that perturbation may provide some protection against this
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attack. However, even when the regression coefficients are perturbed, the
regression model can be expected to predict the y-value for a high leverage
point with a high level of accuracy. That is why regressions with leverage
points are disallowed.
Since it is believed that protection against leverage attacks requires a
measure in addition to perturbation, it is unlikely that perturbation alone
will be sufficient to protect against the split leverage attack, which bypasses
the existing protection against leverage attacks. On the other hand, it is
possible that the dropping of random data points from all regressions (as a
protection measure) could provide some protection against the split leverage
attack, since it could result in the high leverage point being dropped from the
subsets X1 and X2. Alternatively, since the attack requires disjoint sets, it
may be possible to prevent the attack by randomly adding a few data points
to all regressions performed on the server. The data points would need to
be carefully selected to have x-values that are close to the ones in the data
set that the attacker/researcher is interested in. Another alternative worth
exploring might involve adding a few phantom data points (not real data)
to make marginal changes to the regression coefficients in all analyses. The
addition of these phantom data points could have the effect of preventing
the partitioning of the data into disjoint sets. Of course, if an attacker is
able to find an appropriate way to adjust for the fact that X1∩X2 6= ∅, then
the addition of data points may not be very useful.
5 Conclusions and future directions
As with all information security problems, protecting against disclosure is
likely to be a cat and mouse game between the integrating authority and the
attacker. Even if the integrating authority has unlimited resources, it may
be impossible to anticipate all possible methods of attack and to provide
protections against them. The misg was able to provide the abs with some
new issues to consider in improving the security of their system. These
include:
• a new attack that exposes a potential vulnerability in the system;
• considering various methods to protect against the new attack;
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Consideration of these issues present several new directions for future
work:
• a formal investigation of the structure of data sets which contain a
leverage point, that can be partitioned into subsets which do not con-
tain leverage points;
• examining whether a dataset can be systematically partitioned to over-
come the defence against models with high correlation;
• determining whether the existing defences are sufficient to protecting
against the split leverage attack;
• developing new protections against the split leverage attack.
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